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COMMENTS ON THE TECHNICAL CHANGES ACT OF 1953
Congress contemplates a complete revision of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1954. As is the situation with all technical laws, the present
federal income and estate tax statutes cause many inequitable situations.'
The Technical Changes Act of 1953 2 was passed in order to rectify the
unjust applications of some sections of the Code immediately rather than
allow the situation to continue an additional year or fifteen months.
The Act contains seventeen sections and applies, with one exception,
to the estate and income tax.8 Most of the provisions have a very limited
scope, some sections being applicable probably to only one or two tax-
payers. The purpose of this note is to explain briefly the change effected
by each section of the Act and to show the probable reasons for the
legislation.
Income Tax
Six of the seventeen changes brought about by this Act merely extend
the time in which certain actions may be taken by a taxpayer. One of
these six is Section 101, which extends Section 112 (b) (7) of the Internal
Revenue Code to the year 1953.
It has been the policy of Congress to encourage dissolution of personal
holding companies through Section 112 (b) (7) .4 For corporations which
might be subject to the personal holding company5 tax or to the tax on
unreasonable accumulations of profits,6 this provision can be used instead
of the one which ordinarily would govern liquidations. 7 Under 112(b) (7)
"qualified electing shareholders" (a technical term defined in the act)8
can postpone present recognition of part of the gain resulting from the
complete liquidation of any corporation according to a liquidation plan
and a written election 9 within a single calendar month during 1951, 1952,
1953. In the liquidation, an individual's gain is taxed as an ordinary
I SEN. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953).
2 Pub. L. No. 287, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 15, 1953).
3- Technical Changes Act of 1953, § 201, amends § 2 of an act to assist in the
collection of cigarette taxes, 63 STAT. 884 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 376 (Supp. 1952):
"forward to" has been struck out and "file with" substituted.
4 Jacob H. Wood, 3 T.C. 186, 188, n. 2 (1944); SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 63 (1950).
) TNT. REV. CODE §§ 500-511.
6 INT. REV. CODE § 102.
7 INT. REV. CODE §,115(c).
8 "Qualified electing shareholder" is further defined in U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.112(b) (7) (1953).
9 Written election must be filed on Form 964 (revised) in duplicate within
thirty days after the liquidation plan is adopted. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b)
(7)-3 (1953).
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dividend to the extent his share of the corporation's profits has accumu-
lated after February 28, 1913. Capital gain, either long or short term, is
recognized to the extent of the individual shareholder's portion of money,
stock, or securities acquired by the corporation after August 15, 1950.
Any excess is not recognized. 10
In the case of a corporation which is not a qualified electing share-
holder of the liquidating company, all gain is capital, either long or short
term. It is recognized to the extent of the greater of either the stock-
holder's portion of cash, stock, or securities acquired by the company
after August 15, 1950, or the stockholder's share of the company's profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913.
With the excess profits tax threats, franchise, license, and dividend
taxes in addition to those mentioned above on corporations, many small
and medium sized companies have found that a partnership or proprietor-
ship form of doing business would result in substantial tax savings.
Liquidation, however, if not completed under Section 112 (b) (7), might
result in prohibitive taxes where gain is unrealized, as in the case of real
estate, patents, trade-marks, and goodwill which have greatly increased
in value.11 It should be noted that this section does not eliminate the tax
on gains, but merely postpones it.
An election under this section should not be made if the corporation
has accumulated large earnings since 1913 since the shareholder would
then incur a large dividend tax. Then too, the basis of property received
will remain low for later depreciation or sale.
The application of this provision is not extensive, but it should not be
overlooked in a proper case to effect postponement of substantial taxes to
more advantageous periods.
Section 113(d) of the Code was amended by the Technical Changes
Act, Section 102. This amendment concerns the phrase "allowed, but not
less than the amount allowable" formerly used in Section 113 (b) (1) (B)
in referring to depreciation of property. Its purpose in being introduced
into the Code was to prevent double deductions resulting from excessive
depreciation and later restoration of the correct basis after the running
of the statute of limitations with subsequent additional deductions.'
2
10 INT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (18) provides that a qualified electing shareholder's
basis is the same as the basis of the stock redeemed less the money received plus the
recognized gain.
11 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1950, § 8, p. 4, col. 1. By dissolving corporations which
own appreciated real estate, § 112(b) (7) indirectly boosts mortgage lending and
sales.
12 SEN. R . No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1932).
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In Helvering v. Virginian Hotel Corp.'3 the taxpayer was allowed
excessive depreciation for ten years on hotel carpets and furnishings.
Later the Commissioner reduced the rates of depreciation and applied
them to the depreciated basis. In several of the years in which excessive
deductions had been allowed, they resulted in no tax benefit because the
hotel corporation had sustained a net loss in excess of its allowed ap-
preciation. The court applied the above phrase literally in deciding that
the basis of property must be reduced by excessive depreciation allowed
whether or not it produced any tax benefit.' 4 The court admitted the
harshness of its rule, but stated that "the remedy is with Congress and
not the courts or the executive." 15
Because of this decision Congress amended Section 113(b) (1) (B)
and added Section 113 (d).16 The new provisions gave an election to the
taxpayer until December 31, 1952, to increase the basis of property by
the amount of excessive depreciation taken since February 28, 1913,
which had not produced a tax benefit. 17 Election was to be made by
rules prescribed by the Secretary, but these rules were not released until
December 30, 1952, leaving one day in which to make an election.
An election, if made, applies to all property held by the taxpayer after
February 28, 1913. Carryovers of net operating losses and excess profits
credits are also considered in determining the tax benefit of the deduc-
tion. This amendment extended the time for making an election under
the former provision until December 31, 1954, and permitted revocation
of an election made before January 1, 1953, at any time prior to January
1, 1955.
The provisions benefit most those who had excessive depreciation
coupled with losses in the 1930's. The high rates in recent years have
made this section an important one to consider for possible tax reduction.
Section 103 of the 1953 Act is another instance where the time limita-
tion has been extended an additional year. An election for special treat-
ment of certain war loss recoveries may now be made until December 31,
1953, instead of 1952.18 However, if property is recovered during a tax-
13 132 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 319 U.S. 523 (1943).
14 The affirmance of the decision in effect overruled Pittsburg Brewing Co. v.
Commissioner, 107 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1939), a squarely opposite holding.
15 Helvering v. Virginian Hotel Corp., 132 F.2d 909, 913 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 319
U.S. 523 (1943).
16 66 STAT. 629 (1952), 26 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1952). See [19531
U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 4098.
17 See Sax. Ra'. No. 1160, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952). The question which the
taxpayer must ask in determining his new basis is: Would the tax for the year in
question have been greater but for such deduction?
18 INT. REv. CODE § 127(c) (5).
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able year ending after October 20, 1951, there is no present time limit.
The election provided for under this section is irrevocable when made,
and it applies to all years beginning after December 31, 1941.
Section 127 of the Code provides for deduction of war losses from
income of the taxpayer. Because of previous litigation concerning the
time when a loss actually occurs,19 Congress created statutory presump-
tions as to the time of loss; namely, property in enemy countries is
declared to be lost at the date war is declared, and property in other
countries is considered lost when the enemy comes into control. 20 Former-
ly, the amount of recovery was measured by the fair market value of the
property on the date of recovery. That part of the war loss deduction
which did not give a tax benefit could be recovered tax free. The part
that did result in a tax benefit was considered ordinary income. That part
was a gain on involuntary conversion which was greater than the allow-
able deductions in previous years. The recognition of this latter portion
of the gain depends on disposition of the proceeds of the conversion and
whether they are reinvested in similar property.21
If the taxpayer had deducted his total loss on only one specific piece
of property, the rules stated above work very well. However, if loss on
several properties has resulted, an inequitable result may occur. Since the
excess of the fair market value on the date of recovery over the adjusted
basis at the date of the loss is ordinary income to the extent of the de-
duction allowable in the loss year, where two properties were lost and
only one recovered, the appreciated value of the latter was balanced
against the two lost properties in determining the amount of income tax
benefits received from the war loss. 22 In other words, part of the ap-
preciated value in property recovered was subject to ordinary tax merely
because a deduction had been taken on property not recovered.
Section 341 of the Revenue Act of 195123 amended Section 127(c) of
the Code to provide that the taxpayer could elect to take the recovered
property at the adjusted basis on the date of loss or its fair market value
on the date of recovery. This provision prevents the unjust situation
described above. Section 341 also provided that if no war loss deduction
was claimed or allowed on particular property, its recovery could not be
taxed against other loss property on which a deduction was allowed.
Section 127 still presents some problems for future legislation.24 The
taxpayer must prove his cost or other basis, and in some cases the event
19 United States v. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927).
20 INT. REv. CODE § 127(a) (1).
21 INT. REV. CODE § 112(f).
22 This example is given in SEN. RP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1951).
23 65 STAT. 511, 513 (1951).
24 Kramer, War Losses, Their Continuing Effect Under Section 127, 10 N.Y.U.
INsT. 613, 620 (1952).
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which produced the loss also destroyed the records.25 The courts have
had difficulty determining what constitutes a "recovery" under Section
127(d) .26
During World War II there were various provisions in the Code for
tax exemption for members of the armed forces. 27 Several acts since the
beginning of the "police action" in Korea have extended those pro-
visions. Section 104 of the Technical Changes Act of 1953 extends the
application of Section 154 of the Code from January. 1, 1954, to January
1, 1955.
Section 154 of the Code, added in 1951,2 S provided that any member
of the armed forces who dies while serving in a combat zone29 need pay
no tax imposed by Chapter 1 of the Code during the taxable year of his
death or for any other year ending after June 24, 1950, during which
decedent served at any time in a combat zone. If taxes, interest, or
penalties for the period covered are due at decedent's death they need
not be paid, and if paid they will be refunded. Because of the uncertainty
of the duration of hostilities in the combat zone, the present Act extended
the exemption until the beginning of 1955.
Also amended by this Act was a parallel provision in the estate tax
law. Section 939 (b) of the Code exempts from the additional estate tax
which would otherwise be due, estates of decedents dying under condi-
tions listed above. The application of that subsection is extended from
January 1, 1954, to January 1, 1955. It should be noted that the exemp-
tion does not apply to the basic estate tax.
It has been ruled that in case of a member of the air force killed in
action in 1952 cancellation of the income tax by reason of Section 154
does not eliminate the income on which the tax is based and thus does
not require correction of the records of the Social Security Administration
with regard to decedent's income.a0
Under present law compensation of members of the United States
armed forces which is received for service in a combat zone is excluded; 31
25 Benjamin Abraham, 9 T.C. 222 (1947); Ernest Adler, 8 T.C. 726 (1947).
28 Kenmore v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1953). A house in Vienna
was captured in 1941 and allowed as a loss in that year. Though achieving no actual
repossession, taxpayer claimed "recovery" when the allies occupied the city on April
13, 1945. The house burned on April 30, 1945. A deduction for fire loss was dis-
allowed because the taxpayer had not proved "recovery."
27 SEx. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1951).
28 Revenue Act of 1951, § 334, 65 STAT. 507 (1951).
29 "Combat zone" is defined in INT. REV. CODE § 22(b)(13)(c) as any area
which the President designates as such both by location and time
30 Rev. Rul. 55, 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 259.
31 INT. Rav. CODE § 22(b) (13) was amended by Pub. L. No. 213, 83d Cong., Is
Sess. (Aug. 7, 1953). See [19531 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 3400.
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certain tax due at death is abated under Section 154; and the additional
estate tax is not applied under Section 939(b). Section 345 of the
Revenue Act of 1951,32 which abates the income tax on certain trusts for
members of the armed forces dying in the service, differs from the other
provisions in that its application has been limited to decedents dying
before January 1, 1948. Its scope, however, includes not only military
and naval forces of the United States, but also of any member of the
other United Nations. It is submitted that in the interest of simplicity
all provisions dealing with this subject should be uniform in their appli-
cation, both as to time and subject.
The sixth of the one year extension provisions concerns taxation of life
insurance companies under Sections 201, 203A, and 433(a) (1) (H) of
the Code. Section 105 of the new Act has amended these sections, which
applied in 1951 and 1952, to keep them in force during 1953.
Life insurance companies, because of the nature of their business and
investments and the various legal restrictions imposed on them, are sub-
ject to special federal tax rules. In 1947 and 1948, because of the tax
formula applied to them, life insurance companies generally paid no
income tax. Changes in the yield of investments and in interest rates paid
on reserves have modified that status somewhat.33
Section 202 of the Code34 determines net taxable income for 1949 and
1950 by deducting a certain per cent of net investment income and add-
ing to that amount 3%% of unearned premiums and unpaid losses
accruing from its health and accident business. Adjustments were made
for tax exempt interest and dividends received. Normal corporation tax
and surtax rates applied. The percentage to be deducted was proclaimed
each year by the Secretary and was the same for all companies. 35 This
was intended to be a stopgap provision only.
A different temporary formula appeared in Section 336 of the Revenue
Act of 1951. 6 The income tax rate is fixed at 33Y4% of net investment
income up to $200,000 and 6Y2 % on the excess. Adjustments are made
with respect to exempt interest, dividends received, and health and acci-
dent policy transactions.37 Graduated percentages of income are taxed
by this Act depending on the proportion of net investment income to the
particular policy requirements 38
82 65 STAT. 517 (1951). See note INT. REV. CODE § 162.
33 SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1951).
34 See 1951-2 Cumr. BULL. 316.
35 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.202-1, 202-2 (1953).
36 65 STAT. 507 (1951).
37 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.202-2 (1953).
38 INT. REv. CODE § 203A.
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It must be remembered that the present tax is only temporary. It is
complicated and uncertain, and there are administrative difficulties.
Probably the principal advantage of the new provisions is that they were
estimated to increase revenues in each year by about $58 million over
those derived under the wartime formula. 39 At the present time Congress
is formulating a new method of taxing the life insurance industry.
The principal effect of Section 24(c) of the Code has been to prevent
the taxpayer from deciding in which year certain income is to be included
by him. It provides that no deduction will be permitted for expenses or
interest accrued if all three of the following conditions are present:
40
(1) The expenses were not paid within two and one-half months after the
close of the taxable year.41 (2) The payor and payee use the same
accounting methods so the amount is not includible in the payee's income
for that year.42 (3) The payor and payee were related taxpayers within
the meaning of Section 24 (b) .43
There is a conflict on the question whether constructive payment
fulfills the first requirement. Musselmann Hub-Brake Co. v. Commis-
sioner44 held that there was constructive payment when a demand note
was given within the required time, and thus the expense was deductible.
P. G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner45 stated that payment must ordinarily
be made in cash. Financial ability to pay is an important factor to con-
sider and includes credit balance as well as cash balance on the payor's
books.4
6
Section 202 of the 1953 Act amends Section 24(c) (1) by providing
that the section does not apply if the expenses are paid to or construc-
tively received by the payee. This presents the situation where payment
to the related taxpayer is taxed to him as constructively received, yet not
deductible by the payor because not actually paid during the payor's
taxable year or within two and one-half months thereafter.
This amendment affects taxable years beginning after December 31,
1950. However, an election may be made by the taxpayer to include any
39 SEN. REP. No. 781, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. 30-32 (1951).
40 Fincher Motors, Inc., 43 B.T.A. 673, 676 (1941).
41 P. G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 732 (1945); Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co., P-H 1942 TC ME. DEC.
42,182, aff'd, 131 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1942).
42 In Ace Heater Mfg. Co., P-H 1951 TC MEm. DEC. ff 51,364 (1951), § 24(c)
was not applicable where the accounting methods were the same.
43 Gilbert Herndon, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEC. ff 48,030 (1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d
55 (5th Cir. 1949) (payee was the son of the payor) ; Akron Welding & Spring Co.,
10 T.C. 715 (1948) (payee was principal stockholder of the payor corporation).
44 139 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1943).
45 148 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 732 (1945).
46 Nock Fire Brick Co., P-H 1945 TC MFm. DEC. 45,144 (1945) (ample funds
available to pay officers salary held payment under statute).
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year beginning after December 31, 1945, if certain conditions are met:
(1) Payment must have been taken as constructively received gross in-
come in the proper taxable year; or (2) if this was not done, written
assent to collection of any deficiency for failure to include may be filed.
In such case the statute of limitations is extended for one year after
consent is filed. When, because of the consent the same income is included
for more than one year, double taxation will be prevented by application
of Section 3801 which provides for the correction of the effect of such
errors in the tax law.47
Before the enactment of the Technical Changes Act of 1953, Section
113 (a) (5) of the Code, relating to the basis of property transmitted at
death, provided that in the case of property transferred in trust with
income and power of revocation retained the basis to the grantee would
be the same as if the property had passed by will on the grantor's death.
In other words, the basis would be the fair market value at the date of
the grantor's death, instead of the adjusted basis in the hands of the
grantor.48 This provision is important in cases where the market value
of the property at his death greatly exceeds the grantor's basis. Sub-
sequent sale by the grantee where property is held with the grantor's
basis might result in large taxable gains. If the basis was increased to the
fair market value at grantor's death, as in this section, little or no gain
might be realized.
The word "revoke" has been held to mean something different than
"terminate." In Commonwealth Trust Co. v. United States,49 the inter
vivos trust was terminable but not revocable, and thus in determining
the basis the value of the trust property at the date of death was held to
be immaterial. The court also stated that the fact that the property was
included under Internal Revenue Code Section 811(d) for estate tax
purposes was immaterial since the estate tax does not need to be con-
sistent with provisions of the income tax.50
Section 203 of the present Act amends Section 113(a) (5) to include
in its scope not only a power to revoke, but power retained by the
grantor to make any change in enjoyment through a power to amend,
alter, or terminate a trust. Since there is no difference for estate tax
purposes in a power to revoke, terminate, amend, or alter there should
be none for income tax purposes.
47 See discussion of this section infra.
48 INT. REV. CODE § 113(a) (3).
49 96 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
50 Contra is Edith Hilles Dewess, 1 T.C. 791, 796 (1943), where the court stated
that Congress intended to treat as testimentary dispositions all transfers over which
grantor retained control. "There is nothing to indicate that the term 'right ... to
revoke' was used in any technical sense .....
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This amendment reduces the "basis" conflicts between the estate and
income tax laws. It is submitted that Congress in the interests of uni-
formity might well go further by providing that all property included in
a decedent's estate for tax purposes should be given a basis of the fair
market value at the date of death. Since the estate tax is paid on that
valuation the new owner should have the benefit of that basis. The rule
should be extended to transfers in contemplation of death 51 and transfers
of property held in joint tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety.52
Income of American citizens abroad is excluded from taxation gener-
ally for the purpose of stimulating foreign trade and commerce.53 Before
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1951 in order for the exclusion to
operate a citizen had to be a bona fide resident of a foreign country for
at least an entire taxable year.54 The 1951 Act modified this rule by
providing that any individual citizen of the United States may exclude
from gross income amounts earned from personal services attributable to
that period if he is present in a foreign country for 510 days in 18 con-
secutive months regardless of bona fide residence, and the income is not
received from the United States or its agency.55 Section 116(a) (2) was
designed to promote in connection with the Point Four program the work
in foreign countries of men with technical skills, such as engineers and
managers.56 This section thus allowed workers who could not establish
bona fide residence under Section 116(a) (1) to benefit from the exclu-
sions.
The provision has been abused, however. The case of David E. Rose57
illustrates the possibilities of tax savings. In five years during the war the
taxpayer while employed as an executive in Great Britain for an Ameri-
can motion picture company saved $230,000 in income taxes. His salary
was exempt from United States tax because of bona fide residence in
Great Britain and was exempt from British tax because it was paid to
him in New York. Under the 1951 Act it was not even necessary to
establish bona fide residence.
The popular radio show "Duffy's Tavern" has for years been written
in Puerto Rico, probably motivated in part, at least, by consequent tax
51 See Wurlitzer v. Helvering, 81 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1936).
52 See Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109 (1933).
53 Price v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 901, 903 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
54 Revenue Act of 1942, § 148, 56 STAT. 841 (1942).
55 Revenue Act of 1951, § 321, 26 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2) (Supp. 1952).
56 SEN. RP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
57 16 T.C. 232 (1951). Note that though the question in this case was whether
there was a bona fide residence, the tax avoidance principle is equally applicable to
§ 116(a) (2). See Levin and Mitosky, Tax Saving Practices of Artists and Enter-
tainers, 31 Taxes 21, 27 (1953).
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savings.58 The current practice of producing motion pictures in all parts
of the world has been encouraged greatly by this provision.
Section 204 of the present Act plugs this loophole by limiting the
exemption of Section 116(a) (2) to $20,000 per year for the 18 month
period. If that period does not include an entire taxable year in the 18
months, the exemption is reduced proportionately. The amendment
applies only to amounts received on or after January 1, 1953. This
$20,000 limitation, however, applies only to Section 116(a) (2), and if
the taxpayer can establish bona fide residence in a foreign country under
Section 116(a)(1) there is still opportunity for tax avoidance if that
country has a low income tax or none at all.
In referring to provisions for accelerated amortization of emergency
defense facilities (Section 124A of the Code) it has been stated: 59
Accelerated amortization operates to encourage expansion by permitting
concentration of depreciation allowances in the first few years after con-
struction or acquisition of the facility. It is designed also to help the
taxpayer finance expansion by telescoping much of the process of capital
adjustment into the years immediately ahead when the chances for high
income and full use of the new facilities seem good.
The policy of permitting amortization of emergency facilities has been
carried over to the -agriculture industry in the new Internal Revenue
Code Section 124B to encourage the building or repair of corn cribs, grain
bins, elevators, and public grain warehouses. Bumper grain crops in
previous years have filled the nation's grain bins. To save the expense of
government owned bins, farmers are encouraged to build their own stor-
age facilities by the allowance of a write-off of their cost in a 60-month
period instead of during the life of the structure. The structure may be
amortized to the extent of the amount expended after December 31,
1952, and before January 1, 1957, but only the facility itself may be
amortized, not the land as in Section 124A.
This section, added by Section 206 of the new Technical Changes Act,
does not permit amortization by anyone except those who operate public
grain warehouses or who build the facility with the intention, at the time
of election to amortize, of storing grain raised by them. A subsequent
purchaser may continue the amortization for the remainder of the sixty-
month period.
Election to amortize may be made to begin with the month following
the month of completion or with the beginning of the succeeding taxable
year, and the taxpayer may terminate the amortization as of the begin-
ning of any month by written notice to the Secretary. If the election to
terminate is exercised any remaining balance may be depreciated under
58 Levin and Mitosky, supra note 57, at 27.
59 SN. REP. No. 1107, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1952).
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Section 23 (1) of the Code. Note that ordinary depreciation may be taken
on any part of the facility which cannot be amortized. For example, only
part of a structure might be used for storing grain, or only part of the
expenditures might be made within the permitted time.
There has been much political controversy and some administrative
difficulties with Section 124A. 60 Though there is an acute shortage of
grain storage structures, the same political arguments might be applied
to this new Section 124B. Critics might say that the purpose of this
Section is to give farmers an added tax advantage or to gain their support
for other legislation. Because the wording of this section is much broader
than that of 124A, few adminstrative problems should develop.
Tax carry-overs were introduced into the law in 1942 to permit indus-
try to offset wartime and reconversion losses against wartime profits.
Modifications of the wartime provisions have been continued to encour-
age new businesses.6 1
The Revenue Act of 195062 substituted in Section 122 of the Code for
years beginning after December 31, 1949, a one year carry-back and a
five year carry-forward instead of the existing two year carry-back and
two year carry-forward. This afforded averaging over a longer period of
time, aided new businesses which cannot use carry-backs, and reduced
adminstrative problems involved in carry-backs.63 Congress recognized
an inequity in this section64 and provided in the 1951 Revenue Act65
that corporations formed after December 31, 1945 could carry-over in
taxable years beginning in 1947 an operating loss to three succeeding
taxable years instead of two, thus putting them in a competitive position
with corporations formed in 1950 or later. But inequities still remained in
Section 122 (b).
Section 205 (a) of the new Technical Changes Act applies only to
corporations on a fiscal year basis which were at a tax disadvantage
under the former acts. If a corporation which-began business before 1945
sustained a loss for a year beginning in 1947 and ending in 1948, it may
carry-forward to a third taxable year that proportion of the loss which is
equal to the proportionate number of days of the taxable year falling
after December 31, 1947. Similarly, if a corporation's first taxable year
began in 1949 it can carry forward to a fourth and fifth succeeding year
the part of the loss proportionate to the number of days in the loss year
60 Green, How to Treat Amortization of Emergency Facilities, 10 N.Y.U. IxsT.
599 (1952).
61 Bate, A Critique of Section 122, 26 TAxEs 297 (1948).
62 Revenue Act of 1950, § 215(b) (2) (B), 64 STAT. 938 (1950).
63 SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1950).
64 SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 57 (1951).
65 Revenue Act of 1951, § 330(b), 65 STAT. 505 (1951).
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falling after December 31, 1949. This amendment puts fiscal year cor-
porations on the same terms as calendar year companies with respect to
carry-overs.
A short taxable year is treated the same way as a full taxable year
under Section 122.66 Thus Section 205(b) of this Act provides that in
the case of the reorganization of a railroad corporation, if the taxable
year of the predecessor ended within the taxable year of the successor
corporation, an extra year for the carry-forward is allowed.
Estate Tax
Section 811 of the Internal Revenue Code determines the inclusions in
the estate of a decedent for estate tax purposes.
The effect of Section 207 of the new 1953 Act is to free from any
possibility of estate tax under Section 811 (c) all transfers made prior to
March 4, 1931, in which the transferor reserved the right to receive
income for life.
The situation first became important in May v. Heiner,67 where the
court held such a transfer not to be within the estate tax. The next year
Congress by joint resolution declared the property includible.08 It was
held in Hasset v. Welch69 that the provision was not intended to be
retroactive. May v. Heiner was overruled in 1949 by Commissioner v.
Estate of Church,70 which held that a transfer of property in 1924 with
income reserved for life was taxable to the estate of the grantor who died
in 1939. A dissent in that case stated: 71
In reliance upon a long-settled course of legislative and judicial con-
struction, donors have made property arrangements that should not now
be upset summarily with no stronger reasons for doing so than that former
courts and the Congress did not interpret the legislation in the same way
as this Court now does.
Congress agreed with that dissent, and the Technical Changes Act of
1949 72 superseded the Church case, providing that such transfer would
not be includible if decedent died after February 10, 1939, 73 and before
January 1, 1951. (Church died on December 11, 1939.) Since the Church
case had in effect overruled Hasset v. Welch, and the 1949 Act was
applicable only to this limited period, all other estates not within that
66 Young v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Ark. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d
686 (8th Cir. 1953).
67 281 U.S. 238 (1940).
68 46 STAT. 1516 (1931); see SEN. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1953).
69 303 U.S. 303, 307 (1938) ; SEN. REP. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
70 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
71 Id. at 652-53.
72 Technical Changes Act of 1949, § 7b, 63 STAT. 895-6 (1949).
73 This is the date of the approval of the Internal Revenue Code. See 53 STAT.
iii (1939).
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period were subject to the rule in the Church case - clearly an unintend-
ed, unjust result. The provisions of the 1953 Act thus eliminate complete-
ly the effect of the Church decision.
Congress did not provide for extension of the statute of limitations in
pre-1939 estates, stating that no hardship is involved except in cases be-
ing litigated at the time of the Church decision,74 for which it has pro-
vided that refund will be given if application is made by August 15, 1954.
Another Section 811 amendment is effected by Section 208 of this
Act. In 1939 the Supreme Court in Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner75
and in its companion case of Rasquin v. Humphreys76 held that where
a trust settlor created an irrevocable trust retaining power to change the
beneficiaries, an incomplete gift was made, and no gift tax would apply
until the power to change beneficiaries was released. Section 811 (d) in-
cludes the corpus of such trusts in the grantor's estate. Release of the
power at the time of those decisions meant a gift tax on the current value
of the trust, thus creating a hardship in some cases.
To remove this hardship Section 1000(e) of the Code was added by
the Revenue Act of 1943. 77 As amended 78 it provides for the tax free
release of such powers after January 1, 1940, and before January 1,
1948, thereby excluding the corpus of the trust from estate tax under
Section 811(d). If the power was not released in accordance with the
1943 provision the full value was includible in the grantor's estate.
The present Act, applicable to decedents dying after December 31,
1950, provides that property transferred with the reserved power shall
not be included in estates of decedents who were under a mental dis-
ability to release such power from September 30, 1947, until the date of
death. This amendment prevents certain decedents from being penalized
because of this disability. The decedent must be mentally disabled in
fact during the whole period, and a legal declaration of incompetence is
not necessarily controlling.79
The scope of Section 209 of the 1953 Act is extremely limited in its
effect on Section 811 (g) of the Internal Revenue Code. It applies only to
the estates of decedents who died after January 10, 1941, and before
October 22, 1942, leaving life insurance payable to irrevocable bene-
ficiaries under which decedent had a reversionary interest not exceeding
five per cent of the policy value and which did not arise by the express
74 SEN. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1953).
75 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
76 308 U.S. 54 (1939).
77 Revenue Act of 1943, § 502(a), 58 STAT. 71 (1944).
78 Pub. L. No. 112, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 61 STAT. 178 (1947).
79 SEN. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1953).
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terms of the policy. Nor does the new section apply if all of decedent's
policies did not total more than $40,000, and if decedent possessed any
"legal incidents of ownership" after January 10, 1941.80
The inclusion of life insurance in an estate has long been a trouble-
some problem. The government on January 10, 1941, issued new definite
rules intended to clarify the tests for includibility of insurance proceeds.81
Insurance payable to other beneficiaries in excess of $40,000 was taxable,
(1) to the extent taken out by decedent on his own life after January 10,
1941; and (2) to the extent taken out by decedent on his own life on or
before January 10, 1941, and with respect to which he possessed any
legal incidents of ownership after such date.
The Revenue Act of 1942, Section 404,82 specifically applying only to
decedents dying after October 21, 1942, excluded insurance paid to bene-
ficiaries if (1) decedent paid no premiums, and (2) had no incidents of
ownership. Premiums paid before January 11, 1941, on insurance in
which decedent had no incidents of ownership were not treated as paid
by decedent. However, there was no provision which excluded a reversion
as an incident of ownership. For example, if the insured named his wife
irrevocable beneficiary on a policy paid up before 1941 and named his
estate to receive the proceeds if she predeceased him, the proceeds would
be includible in his estate.
In the case of Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner,83 under state law the
decedent had a right of reverter in an inter vivos trust. The chances of
the property reverting were less than 12 out of 100, but the entire trust
corpus was included in decedent's estate, increasing the tax by $450,000.
As a result of this decision Congress in 1950 84 modified Section 404 of
the 1942 Act to include in the gross estate a reversionary interest (1) if
it exceeded five percent of the value of the policy, and (2) arose by the
express terms of the policy or other instrument. This amendment was an
equitable adjustment to the problem except in one respect: It was
limited by the 1942 Act, which applied only to decedents dying after
October 21, 1942. The present Technical Changes Act merely extends the
1950 amendment to the period from January 10, 1941, to October 21,
1942.
An already complex provision of the estate tax law, Section 812 (e),
is complicated even more by Section 210 of the Technical Changes Act
of 1953.
80 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.27(c) (1943).
81 T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 427.
82 Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 STAT. 944 (1942).
83 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
84 Revenue Act of 1950, § 503, 64 STAT. 962 (1 O''\
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The Revenue Act of 19 4 8 8s added the marital deduction provision to
the Code. It affected estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1947
by allowing, among other things, a tax free transfer in trust to the sur-
viving spouse of a general power of appointment. To qualify, the power
must include the right of unrestricted disposition either during life or by
will.86
It came to the attention of Congress that certain decedents who died
after December 31, 1947, and on or before April 2, 1948, the enactment
date, had substantially fulfilled the requirements for the power of ap-
pointment to qualify for the marital deduction except that the transfer
was not in trust.8 7 The new amendment provides that in those cases the
requirement of a transfer in trust should be waived, the reason being that
estates should not be penalized for failure to meet a merely technical
requirement. Then too, the decedent would surely have qualified had he
not died before the enactment date, April 2, 1948.88 An election to take
advantage of this amendment may be made within one year of the date
of its enactment, i.e., until August 15, 1954.
Section 211 of the new Act added paragraphs (6) and (7) to Section
3801 of the Code. The latter section provides in certain described
instances for corrections of an erroneous tax result which otherwise would
be barred by the statute of limitations in instances where an inconsistent
position is maintained by the taxpayer or the Commissioner.
Paragraphs (6).and (7) apply where there has been no inconsistent
position taken. Paragraph (6) provides that if a determination under
the law disallows to the taxpayer a deduction which should have been
allowed either in a different year or to a related taxpayer, then an adjust-
ment will be made. Two criteria are necessary: (1) The determination
must have become final on or after June 1, 1952. (2) The claim for credit
must not have been barred at the time the taxpayer first claimed in
writing that he was entitled to the deduction for the year in which it was
disallowed.
Under paragraph (7) if a determination under the tax law excludes
from gross income in one year an item which is includible either in an-
other taxable year or by a related taxpayer, then an adjustment will be
made. Two requirements must be met: (1) The determination must have
become final on or after June 1, 1952. (2) Assessment of a deficiency for
the other taxable year must not have been barred at the time the Secre-
tary first maintained in a deficiency notice that the item should have
been included in the income of that other taxable year.
85 Revenue Act of 1948, § 361, 62 STAT. 117 (1948).
86 INT. REv. CODE, § 812(e) (1) (F).
87 SEN. REP. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1953).
88 Ibid.
